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Abstract 
Is an economy with adverse selection, moral hazard, or an incomplete set of risk 
markets ‘constrained’ Pareto efficient? There are two sets of papers addressing this 
question, one asserting that, under seemingly quite general conditions, the economy 
is constrained Pareto efficient, the other (to which we have contributed) that it is 
not. In this paper, we delineate the differences in assumptions between the two sets 
of papers, and under our assumptions present an intuitive proof of the Pareto 
inefficiency of market equilibrium with moral hazard and identify what it is that the 
government can do that the market cannot. 
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Arrow and Debreu’s proof of the fundamental theorems of welfare 
economics is one of the crowning achievements of economic science. Adam 
Smith’s invisible hand conjecture - that competition would lead to efficient 
resource allocation - was put on a rigorous footing. The assumptions 
required were very strong. Their work has stimulated a stream of papers 
attempting to show that the results hold under weaker conditions. 
One line of that research has attempted to identify the role of assump- 
tions concerning perfect information and complete markets. Is a competitive 
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economy with adverse selection, moral hazard, or an incomplete set of risk 
markets ‘constrained’ Pareto efficient? The word constrained emphasizes 
that though one surely expects adverse selection and moral hazard to affect 
the nature of the equilibrium, the relevant question is: even when the 
informational imperfections cannot be corrected, can government interven- 
tion make some individuals better off without making anyone else worse 
off? 
In recent years, this line of research has culminated in two strands of 
papers, one asserting that, under seemingly quite general conditions, the 
economy is constrained Pareto efficient, the other (to which we have 
contributed) that it is not. We will not comment here on the underlying 
ideological bases of these alternative research programs or the potentially 
large differences in policy implications arising from these different views of 
the potential role of government. 
Our objectives here are more narrow: to attempt to delineate the 
differences in assumptions going into the different results; to present a new 
proof of the Pareto inefficiency of market equilibrium with moral hazard 
under our informational assumptions, which will serve to provide a stronger 
intuition for why markets are constrained Pareto inefficient; and to identify 
what it is that the government can do that markets cannot. 
1. The basic argument 
In an earlier paper (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986), we showed that 
informational imperfections give rise to externality-like effects. For exam- 
ple, in models of adverse selection, where employers cannot identify the 
ability of an individual worker, but the average quality of workers depends 
on wages and prices, government might affect the quality of the labor pool 
by a set of selective taxes and subsidies, designed to encourage the more 
productive workers to supply more labor and the less productive workers 
less. In models of moral hazard, where an individual’s level of care at 
accident avoidance depends both on the level of insurance coverage and 
prices, the government can increase the level of care by subsidizing 
complements to care and taxing substitutes. Thus, if smoking increases the 
probability of a fire, then taxing cigarettes reduces accident rates because it 
reduces smoking. 
The fact that government actions can have effects seems obvious in both 
cases. Why do we argue that there are ‘externalities’ giving rise to potential 
scope for government intervention. 7 The reason is that the individual, in 
making his decision, in the first case about the level of labor supply and in 
the second case about the level of care, focuses only on her private costs and 
benefits. But there are further ramifications. In the adverse selection model, 
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workers are wage takers. When all good workers work a little more, the 
average productivity of those supplying labor increases. The firm takes the 
average quality of those it hires as given, but its profits obviously increase 
(at a given wage) with the average quality. Thus, the increase in labor supply 
of the more productive workers has an ‘external’ effect on the profits of 
firms, which they collectively fail to take into account. 
Or consider the moral hazard problem. The individual, in making his 
effort decision, knows that the insurance firm cannot monitor care. He bases 
his decision on the cost of care versus the cost of an accident, and the 
changed likelihood of an accident resulting from greater care. He will 
choose the level of care to maximize his expected utility. At the margin, 
were he to exert slightly greater care, there would be a second-order effect 
on his own expected utility, but because the accident probability would go 
down, there would be a first-order effect on the insurance company’s profits; 
there is an externality, which he fails to take into account. 
We can express this externality-like effect in another way, by ‘netting out’ 
the insurance firm. Assume that premiums, determined in competitive 
markets, equal the actuarial value of the losses. Consider any particular 
level of benefits in the case of an accident. Each individual, in deciding how 
much care to exert, takes the premium as given. But when all individuals 
exert more care, the premium is reduced, and they all can be made better 
off. The government, by subsidizing complements to care, can induce 
individuals to take greater care. If individuals have optimized their budget 
over various goods, there is a second-order loss from the distortion 
associated with the induced change in consumption patterns, but a first- 
order effect arising from the reduced premiums. 
There are four basic sets of cases in which government intervention might 
not be able to help. The first is where there is only one good. Then the 
government obviously cannot use commodity taxes to attain a Pareto 
improvement. It was natural for many of the early papers exploring the role 
of adverse selection, moral hazard, or incomplete markets to focus on single 
commodity models; after all, the particular phenomenon under study had 
nothing directly to do with many commodities. Many of the papers in the 
strand of literature attempting to generalize Arrow and Debreu fell into the 
‘trap’ of not realizing that the welfare properties of one-commodity models 
are special. (See, for instance, Diamond, 1967 and Shavell, 1979.) 
The second set of cases involve those where the seeming market 
imperfection is just that, only a ‘seeming’ imperfection. The unobservability 
of effort at accident avoidance would not cause a problem if the elasticity of 
effort with respect to insurance benefits were zero (i.e. individuals would 
always take the efficient level of care, regardless of whether they were being 
watched). This seems - and is - a trivial result. But equally trivial (but 
perhaps slightly less transparent) is the result that if everyone is identical, 
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the absence of risk markets has no consequences, since even if there were 
risk markets, there would be no trade on them. Thus, one cannot use 
representative agent models to study the consequences of the absence of risk 
markets. We will not list the papers that have fallen into this trap. 
A third set of cases involves imposing a set of constraints on the 
government which is artificial, but under which the market can do as well as 
the government. These cases have arisen primarily in the context of the 
analysis of market equilibrium with incomplete risk markets, where it was 
not apparent what the appropriate comparison ought to be. Diamond (1967) 
suggested that in evaluating the stock market, the constraint to put on the 
government was that it make payments to individuals as linear functions of 
profits (since share ownerships make distributions linear functions of 
profits). As we have seen, in general with more than one commodity, even 
with this restrictive constraint, equilibrium is not constrained Pareto effi- 
cient. But there is one case where it is; if everyone has unitary price 
elasticities of demand, then (if output is the source of randomness) profits 
(price times quantity) will be constant. Hence, the stock market provides no 
risk transfer at all, and constraining government to make payments a linear 
function of profits is constraining them too to making no risk transfer. 
Grossman (1977) set out explicitly to find the constraint under which the 
market allocation is efficient. Following Samuelson, he reasoned, in effect, 
that surely there must be some constrained optimization problem for which 
the market represented the solution. The resulting notion he called Social 
Nash Optimality (SNOP); it entailed (in a two-period model) first fixing the 
level of transfers to each individual in each state of nature. The problem was 
that this was a completely artificial constraint. To be sure, in any particular 
equilibrium, there were particular levels of transfers. But the question was, 
if the government intervenes, say by taxing investment in some sector, why 
should it take the transfers as fixed? Diamond’s constraint was a far more 
natural one, though still somewhat artificial since with options and futures 
markets more complicated (yet still simple) payment structures can be 
made. 
In the first set of cases, the government could not affect the commodity 
composition, since there was only one commodity. In the final set of cases, 
the government cannot affect the commodity composition any better than 
the market because the market can directly control patterns of consumption. 
That is, if, say, in the case of moral hazard, the insurance firm could directly 
observe consumption bundles, it could make insurance coverage conditional 
on individuals consuming particular consumption bundles. While the insur- 
ance firm could not monitor the level of care, it could clearly do as well as 
any government which could use only tax policy to control consumption 
patterns, and thereby, indirectly, affect the level of care. 
R. Arnott et al. I Information Economics and Policy 6 (1994) 77-88 81 
Actually, to attain constrained Pareto optimality, the private insurance 
firms have to do more than that; they must constrain the amount of 
insurance that individuals purchase from outsiders, either directly (by not 
allowing such purchases), or indirectly, by making the premiums charged 
depend on the amounts purchased from outsiders. Outside purchases of 
insurance have externality-like effects, since with the additional purchases, 
individuals have less incentive to exercise care, and therefore the profits of 
all those providing insurance are affected deleteriously. 
In short, with effectively complete control of the quantities of all 
commodities consumed and all insurance purchased, the government could 
do no better than the private market. 
This case is obviously not of much economic interest; insurance firms can, 
at most, monitor an individual’s purchases of goods, not his consumption. If 
there were more than one type of individual in the economy, then the 
‘forced’ levels of consumption associated with the optimal insurance contract 
would entail differing marginal rates of substitution across individuals, and 
there would, accordingly, be an incentive to trade. Indeed, the possibility of 
such arbitrage is one of the reasons that limited use of non-linear pricing 
(taxes) is made, except for utilities, like electricity and telephone service, 
where resale is difficult. 
While insurance firms do make some attempt to monitor the purchases of 
insurance coverage for the same accident, these are imperfect; for example, 
health insurance firms do not monitor the implicit insurance provided by 
employers and family (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1991). And they do not monitor 
the insurance provided against other risks, which may affect the level of care 
significantly (e.g. because of cross elasticities generated by a common pool 
of savings). 
Health insurance firms do not even attempt to monitor the most relevant 
aspects of consumption-such as alcohol and tobacco - and the notion that 
they might extend this to the entire range of commodities purchased by 
individuals seems ludicrous. 
Yet the assumption of such monitoring lies behind the Prescott- 
Townsend (1984) arguments for the efficiency of market economies with 
moral hazard. Discussions of their paper have focused on their use of 
lotteries, and such lotteries do play an important role in the analysis of 
existence; the non-convexities that are inherently associated with moral 
hazard (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1988b) and other information problems give rise 
to existence problems (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1990a) in the absence of 
randomization, and provide incentives within market contexts to randomize 
(Arnott and Stiglitz, 1988a). The issue we are emphasizing here is not the 
desirability of such randomization, nor its practical relevance. Rather, the 
issue is what are the ‘objects’ over which randomization occurs? Can the 
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contracts completely specify consumption quantities? Or are the contracts 
more restrictive, e.g. specifying payments under certain contingencies, or 
possibly even levels of consumption of some commodities, but not of all 
commodities? 
In short, if the private market has enough information, it can do without 
compEete information; complete knowledge of an individual’s consumption 
may suffice, at least for obtaining a constrained Pareto optimum, when 
direct knowledge about her actions is not obtainable. But information is 
more incomplete than Prescott and Townsend envisage. Government can 
affect care indirectly through affecting consumption patterns, in ways which 
private firms cannot. Before turning to why this is so, we briefly sketch a 
new proof showing how taxation can lead to a Pareto improvement. Our 
proof highlights the role of self-selection (or incentive compatibility) 
constraints. 
2. A new proof of the constrained pareto inefficiency of the market with 
moral hazard 
We present a simplified case with moral hazard, where: (i) all individuals 
are identical; (ii) each has the possibility of two levels of care, e” and eL, 
with pi the accident probability when the care level is ei, with pH <pL (H 
represents high care, L low care); (iii) either a fixed-damage accident 
occurs, or it does not; (iv) an individual’s purchases of insurance are 
observable; (v) production possibilities are linear, and goods are measured 
such that the producer prices of all goods equal unity; and (vi) the utility 
function is separable between consumption and effort. 
The market solution in the absence of commodity taxation is that contract 
{a, p}, where (Y is the net benefit in the event of accident and /? the 
premium, which maximizes expected utility subject to the zero profit 
constraint 
4e(a7 P)) = PC1 - M~7 P>> 7 (1) 
where effort is a function of the benefit and premium. An individual’s 
expected utility, with contract {(.u, p}, when he chooses care level e’, is 
V(a, p;e’). Individuals choose high care with little insurance, and low care 
with a lot. The switch line is defined as those {(Y, /3} for which the individual 
is indifferent between the two care levels: 
V(a, p; eH) = V(cy, p; eL) . (2) 
The switch line as well as the zero profit constraint are depicted in Fig. 1. 
The actual level of utility attained with contract {a, /3} is defined by max, 
R. Arnott et al. / Information Economics and Policy 6 (1994) 77-88 83 






V(a, p, e) = V*((Y, p). The indifference curves, given by V*(a, p) = v, are 
also drawn in Fig. 1. The market equilibrium which maximizes V* subject to 
the zero profit constraint, is at 8. We focus on the case where 8 is at the 
intersection of the switch line and the zero profit locus for the high-care 
activity (defined by apH = p(1 -p”)). This provides the most extensive 
insurance coverage possible that is consonant with non-negative profits and 
with the individual undertaking the safe activity. 
Low Care 
-pH) 
New Switch Line 
Old Switch Line 
Fig. 2 
84 R. Arnott et al. I Information Economics and Policy 6 (1994) 77-88 
A ‘small’ amount of commodity taxation has two effects. First, it has a 
‘second-order’ effect from the standard deadweight loss which it induces, 
i.e. the loss of consumer surplus increases with the square of the tax rate. 
Secondly, it may shift the switch line out, as illustrated in Fig. 2. Because at 
8, the indifference curve is not, in general, tangent to the zero profit line for 
the safe activity, any outward movement in the switch line has a first-order 
effect on utility, Any tax or subsidy which makes the safe activity (high care) 
slightly more attractive (at t9) than the risky activity allows the provision of 
additional insurance. Since insurance was strictly rationed, the gain from the 
provision of the additional insurance outweighs the second-order effect of the 
loss of consumer surplus. 
To see this formally, we generalize our model to allow for commodity 
taxation. The vector of goods is X, and the associated vector of consumer 
prices, q. Let VH be expected utility when activity H is undertaken. The 
indirect utility function is now VH(a, /?, q). With commodity taxation, the 
social revenue constraint is’ 
‘YP H = p(1 -p”) + (q - l)XH (3) 
where 
XH = pHXH’ + (1 - pH)XH” ) (4) 
where XH’ . IS the consumption vector in the event of an accident and XH” in 
the event of no accident. The problem of the government is to choose 
{a, p, q} to maximize VH subject to the social revenue constraint and the 
self-selection constraint that the individual expend high care, i.e. VH > V’.. 
We write the Lagrangian 
L+vH+y(cYpH- P(1 -P”) - (4 - 1)X”) 
+ h(VH(o, P, 4) - VL(% P> 4)) . (5) 
To see that corrective taxation is welfare-enhancing, we differentiate the 
Lagrangian, evaluate the derivative at q = 1 - that is, at a situation where 
there is no differential taxation - and show that in fact the derivative is not, 
I In the absence of commodity taxation. the market solution and the constrained social 
optimum coincide. Here the government both provides insurance and taxes commodities. Thus. 
strictly speaking, what we show is that a Pareto improvement is possible if the government both 
taxes commodities and takes over the provision of insurance from the market. When the 
government taxes commodities and the market provides insurance, the analysis is more 
complicated but taxation remains desirable. 
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in general, equal to zero, so that some differential commodity taxation is 
desirable. 
Differentiation of the Lagrangian with respect to q, (Y, and p yields2 
a2 
q=l 





ap = VP” - y(1 -p”) + A(VpH - VP”) = O} (8) q=l 
where Vi denotes (Wi)/(dqk). Now Vi = -pipylX: - (1 -pi)pioXz (by 
Roy’s Identity), Vb =pipil, and Vk = -(l -pi)pZo, where pi0 is the margi- 
nal utility of income with care level i in the event of no accident, etc. Then 
multiplying (&Y)l(a~)14=1 by X,“‘,(6&‘)l(ap),,l by -XF”, and adding the 
resulting equations to (a2') /( aqk)l 4 =1 yields 
ax 
aqk q=l 
= h(pL/.LL'(X,L' - xy) + (1 - pL)PLo(x;O - XY”)) . (9) 
Defining 6” = pLpL1 + (1 - pL)pLo, and Xi = (pLpLIXy + 
(1 - p”)~““x’,“)/(@~) to be ‘average’ consumption of good k with care level 
i, this equation can be rewritten as 
a2 
aqk q=l 
= A,GL(j?: - x;) 
<OifX,H>X: 
>OifXr<X,L (10) 
Thus, unless ‘average’ consumption of the good is the same in the two 
activities, it always pays to tax or subsidize the commodity. Again, the 
intuition behind this result is straightforward. The amount the individual is 
hurt or helped by taxing a commodity is proportional to the amount of the 
good he consumes. Thus, if the amount he consumes of some commodity 
should he undertake the safe activity is less than the amount he consumes of 
that commodity should he undertake the risky activity, then a tax on that 
commodity will hurt him less if he is undertaking the safe activity. At the 
margin, this encourages him to use the safe activity; if he was indifferent 
before, now he strictly prefers the safe activity. Conversely, if the amount 
he consumes of some commodity with the safe activity exceeds that with the 
risky, then a subsidy on that commodity benefits him more when he 
‘The terms aX/$ etc. disappear since they are preceded by (4 - 1) which equals zero with 
q=l. 
86 R. Arnott et al. I Information Economics and Policy 6 (1994) 77-W 
undertakes the safe activity; if he was indifferent before, now he again 
prefers the safe activity.’ 
3. The powers of government 
In recent years, there has developed a folk wisdom that anything the 
government can do, the private sector can do - and probably better. This 
ignores the fact that government has powers - powers of compulsion and 
proscription - which no private firm has.4 Private economic relations are by 
their nature voluntary (ignoring the Mafia). The government has the power 
to impose a tax on all production of a commodity. It also has the power to 
proscribe unauthorized production of a commodity, a power which makes 
the enforcement of its taxing powers easier. Contrast the problem of a firm 
wishing to discourage smoking or to encourage the use of smoke detectors 
with that of the government. The firm could subsidize smoke detectors, but 
it would find it difficult to prevent the individual from reselling the 
subsidized smoke detector to someone else. The firm might ‘insist’ on its 
customer buying all cigarettes at above-market prices through the firm store 
(effectively imposing a tax), but how could it enforce such a requirement? 
General equilibrium economists might suggest that the firm subsidize all 
other commodities, but the practical problems of doing this should be 
obvious; besides, this does not resolve the problem of resale. The govern- 
ment can impose a tax or subsidy on all production, something that no single 
firm can. 
The externality-like effects which we have identified are far more 
pervasive than the problems that were discussed in the older ‘market 
failures’ literature. For instance, externalities that arise in the provision of 
insurance in the labor market (for instance, against the risk that a worker 
finds out after he has joined a firm that the idiosyncratic match is bad) reach 
out from each firm to virtually all other firms in the economy. (See Arnott 
and Stiglitz, 1985.) 
Our analysis has, in fact, understated the potential scope for government 
intervention, for we have focused on identifying instances where govern- 
ment can achieve a Pareto improvement only through the imposition of 
linear commodity taxes. There are instances where more active government 
3 This result is not due to nonconvexity. With a continuum of activities and convex indifference 
curves, an analogous result obtains. And since randomization may be desirable only when 
indifference curves are nonconvex, the result is not due either to our having restricted the 
analysis to deterministic contracts and taxes. If there are welfare gains from a small 
randomization, they are second-order (see Arnott and Stiglitz. lY88a). Since the welfare gains 
here for a small tax are first-order, they cannot be related to randomization. 
’ For a further articulation of these issues, see Stiglitz (1990). 
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intervention, e.g. through the control of quantities (say the quantity of 
insurance made available) can increase welfare even further (see Arnott and 
Stiglitz, 1990b). 
4. Conclusions 
With incomplete markets and imperfect information, markets are not, in 
general, constrained Pareto efficient. From this perspective, the genius of 
Arrow and Debreu was to find the almost singular example of an economy - 
involving complete markets and perfect information - for which the market 
is efficient. The subsequent literature has identified a number of other 
exceptional cases in which the economy is constrained Pareto efficient. But 
the generic result, on the inefficiency of markets, appears robust. 
Whether intervention by an actual government, rather than the ideal 
(though information-constrained) government we have considered, would 
be welfare improving, and what forms of government intervention are most 
likely to be welfare improving,5 are issues beyond the scope of this short 
paper. 
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